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I.

INTRODUCTION
Idaho law requires the question of whether a defendant owes a duty to a plaintiff to be

determined at the time of the injury. Caldwell v. Idaho Youth Ranch, Inc., 132 Idaho 120, 12324, 968 P.2d 215 (1998). The court considers whether the defendant exercised reasonable care
only after control at the time of the injury is established. Id. at 124. In this case, there has never
been an issue of fact—either at summary judgment or at trial—regarding whether either of the
Munkhoffs had custody and control over Sam’s dog (“Bo”) when Bo bit Respondent, Klaus
Kummerling (“Kummerling”). This fact is dispositive. Id.
Because the threshold issue of custody and control at the time of the injury was undisputed,
the trial court erred in denying Appellants Mark Munkhoff and Robyn Munkhoff’s (collectively,
“Munkhoffs”) motion for summary judgment as to the negligence claim and erred in denying the
Munkhoffs’ motion for new trial and for remittitur.
Kummerling responds by asking this Court to change Idaho law, arguing that liability should
be determined by examining the extent and nature of the prior custody, regardless of whether or
not custody and control existed at the time of the injury. Even if a change in the law were
justified, the argument’s factual premise is unsupported by the evidence and Kummerling’s own
testimony at trial.
Adopting a rule that imposes a duty that extends beyond the scope of the defendant’s custody
and control would expand the duties and liability of all entities and persons who have custody
and care of persons and animals, including schools, boarding kennels and stables, youth camps,
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and religious organizations. This Court has previously rejected such calls for a change in law and
should do so again here.
Instead, this Court should affirm established principles of negligence by holding the trial
court erred in denying the Munkhoffs’ motion for summary judgment and compounded that error
by finding there was sufficient evidence at trial to support the jury’s verdict against the
Munkhoffs.
II.

REBUTTAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On appeal, Kummerling fails to present any facts or argument disputing Sam Munkhoff’s

sole custody and control over Bo at the time of the injury and fails to present facts or argument
linking the injury to any alleged breaches of duty that may have occurred while the Munkhoffs
did have custody of Bo. Instead, Kummerling claims (contrary to the record) that the Munkhoffs
had continuous custody of Bo from November 2012 until the date of the injury and intermingles
evidence that was not presented until trial with the record on summary judgment, creating the
appearance of issues of fact where none existed.
Because the record at summary judgment established no genuine issue of material fact, the
Munkhoffs were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Because the jury’s verdict was
excessive and based on insufficient evidence (including no evidence that the Munkhoffs had
custody of Bo at the time of the injury), the Munkhoffs’ motion for new trial should have been
granted.
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A. Kummerling extends and misstates numerous facts in order to create the impression
that the Munkhoffs and Sam Munkhoff were joint owners of Bo.
Though not material to whether the Munkhoffs had custody and control of Bo at the time of
the incident, Kummerling repeatedly asserts to this Court that the Munkhoffs continuously cared
for and housed Bo from November 2012 until the incident. (Resp. Br. at 3, 4, 13) At summary
judgment, however, the trial court found “no evidence on the record that [Bo] was harbored at
Defendants’ residence when the prior incidents [in November, February, and April] occurred; in
fact the record reflects he was not.” (R 186) The trial court went further to point out that
harboring or keeping a dog that has been declared dangerous is not sufficient to establish
liability. (R 186)
The record as a whole reflects that (1) from at least November 2012 until May 2013 Sam and
Bo were living at 1109 E. Walnut in Coeur d’Alene, (2) afterwards Sam and Bo lived on 18th
Street, (3) prior to Kummerling’s injury Sam and other family members reported to Animal
Control that Sam and Bo were not living with the Munkhoffs, (4) Kummerling did not see Bo at
the Munkhoffs’ home very often prior to July 30, 2013, and (5) Kummerling’s wife had never
seen Bo prior to the bite. (R 63, ¶2; R 69, ¶3.B; R 72, ¶4; R 74, ¶6.A, R 80, R 93, R 99; Tr. Vol. I
p. 58 ll. 10-17, p. 137 ll. 20-25, Tr. Vol. II p. 228 l. 12 to p. 229 l. 10, p. 236 l. 24 to p. 237 l. 2)
This evidence is all inconsistent with Kummerling’s assertion for the first time on appeal that Bo
resided with the Munkhoffs (but not Sam) continually from November 2012 until July 30, 2013.
Kummerling’s assertion is also inconsistent with the undisputed fact that only Sam was cited for
violating Coeur d’Alene City Ordinances governing aggressive or dangerous dogs. (R 101)
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Sam Munkhoff testified that Bo stayed with the Munkhoffs while Sam was working in North
Dakota, from July 5-30, 2013. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 238 ll. 17-23, p. 241 ll. 19-21, p. 245 ll. 4-11, p.
263 ll. 17-22) This is consistent with Robyn Munkhoff’s contemporaneous statements to Officer
Laurie Deus (though not Ms. Deus’s assumption that Sam Munkhoff had been working in North
Dakota for months) and with the Kummerlings’ testimony regarding how little they had seen Bo
prior to the date of injury. (R 99; Tr. Vol. I p. 58 ll. 10-17, p. 137 ll. 20-25)
Again, regardless of how long or often Bo had stayed at the Munkhoffs’ home, the key facts
material to both duty and causation were the facts that Sam Munkhoff removed Bo from his
parents’ property, took him on a walk, did not muzzle Bo, and allowed Kummerling to approach
Bo; whereupon Kummerling was bit. (R 64 ¶6, R 112 ¶3; Tr. Vol. I, p. 74 ll. 6-17, p. 75 ll. 4-24,
p. 75 ll. 13-19, p. 76 ll. 6-14) These facts were undisputed at summary judgment and at trial. Id.
They remain undisputed on appeal. (Resp. Br. at 5)
B. The facts material to duty and causation were undisputed or uncontested at
summary judgment.
The Munkhoffs identified the material facts that were undisputed at summary judgment.
(App’ts’ Br. at 4) Kummerling failed to meet his burden of citing to admissible portions of the
record at summary judgment to create an issue of fact as to any of the identified material facts.
(Resp. Br. at 2-6) Instead, Kummerling attempts to create the impression that a question of fact
existed at summary judgment by merging those facts presented at summary judgment with those
that were not presented until trial. (See Resp. Br. at 2-6) Those new factual allegations, however,
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go to credibility and to the length of time that Bo was cared for by the Munkhoffs, and not to
facts determinative of duty or causation. -Id.
Kummerling also seeks to create an issue of fact with statements that are unsupported by the
record. For example, Kummerling suggests that Sam Munkhoff was working in North Dakota up
to the time of the injury. (Resp. Br. at 4) The record cited, however, states only that Bo had been
staying in the Munkhoffs’ backyard when Sam Munkhoff was in North Dakota, and that only
when Sam was absent the Munkhoffs were the sole custodians of Bo. (R 99, 113 ¶7) Regardless
of how long Bo stayed at the Munkhoffs’ home, Kummerling agrees that only Sam had custody
and control over Bo at the time of the attack. (Resp. Br. at 5)
Kummerling also attempts to create the impression that admissible evidence in the record
created an issue of fact as to whether alleged deficient signage was a cause of his injury. (R. 5-6)
Although the Munkhoffs raised causation at summary judgment, Kummerling presented no
admissible evidence creating a genuine issue of fact as to whether his injury was caused by any
alleged breach of duty by the Munkhoffs, even assuming the Munkhoffs continued to owe a duty
when Sam resumed custody of Bo. (R 107-129; Tr. Vol. I p. 12 ll. 6-9, p. 17 ll. 11-14, p. 18 l. 25
to p. 19 l. 4 (striking and limiting portions of the Declaration of K. Kummerling)) On appeal,
Kummerling points to Kummerling’s own inadmissible double hearsay statement in Officer
Deus’ report submitted by the City of Coeur d’Alene that Kummerling “stated he is very upset
that he did not know that a dog declared aggressive by animal control was living next door and
that he was unaware of it. He said he would never have asked to pet the dog if he had known
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that.”1 (R 100) At trial, Kummerling’s testimony regarding his previous interactions with Bo was
inconsistent with his speculation regarding causation. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 59 ll. 5-11; Vol. III p. 367 ll.
10-20)
C. Kummerling failed to present evidence sufficient to support the jury’s verdict at
trial.
More importantly for this appeal, as to the facts admitted at trial, Kummerling relies on
testimony concerning the credibility of Sam Munkhoff and the length of Bo’s stay at the
Munkhoffs’, but points to no evidence of the Munkhoffs’ custody and control of Bo at the time
of the injury or to any evidence indicating that any alleged breach by the Munkhoffs was a cause
of Kummerling’s injury. (Resp. Br. at 28-32) In fact, Kummerling agrees that he was on
Kummerling’s own property, Bo was on a leash held by Sam, and Kummerling asked Sam
Munkhoff if he could pet Bo immediately before the injury occurred. (Resp. Br. at 5)
III.

ARGUMENT

Idaho tort law does not impose liability on supervisors or custodians who no longer have
custody or control of persons or animals that may pose a danger to others. Caldwell v. Idaho
Youth Ranch, Inc., 132 Idaho 120, 124, 968 P.2d 215 (1998). Idaho—just like the other
jurisdictions identified by the Munkhoffs—looks first to whether the owner or custodian had
control over the dangerous animal or person at the time of the injury. Id. at 123-24; McClain v.
Lewiston Fair & Racing Ass’n, 17 Idaho 63, 104 P. 1015, 1026 (1909). Thus, whether the
Munkhoffs had custody and control over Bo at the time of the injury was the threshold issue that
1

Although Kummerling cites R 99 (Resp. Br. at 6), this appears to be a scrivener’s error.
(See R 99-100)
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had to be determined before the Munkhoffs could be found liable. Evidence disputing that fact
was necessary to prevent dismissal of Kummerling’s negligence claim and to support a jury
verdict imposing liability on the Munkhoffs.
Kummerling has never disputed Sam’s exclusive control over Bo at the time of the injury.
Although Kummerling attempts to justify the trial court’s rulings by claiming on appeal that the
Munkhoffs had assumed continuous custody of Bo from November 2012 until the date of the
injury, the trial court found that this was not the case. (R 186)
A. It was undisputed that only Sam had custody and control over Bo at the time of the
injury, and Kummerling presented no evidence showing that any breach while the
Munkhoffs did have custody proximately caused Kummerling’s injury.
Contrary to Kummerling’s unsupported allegation, the Munkhoffs have never claimed “they
had no care, control, or involvement with the dog Bo.” (Resp. Br. at 11) The Munkhoffs have
consistently claimed (and Kummerling has not disputed) that Sam Munkhoff had exclusive care,
control and involvement with Bo at the time of the injury. (See, e.g., R 65 ¶¶6-8) Sam’s sole
custody and control of Bo at the time of the injury rendered the Munkhoffs’ previous care for Bo
and knowledge of his run-ins with Animal Control immaterial. Where there are no genuine
issues of material fact, only a question of law remains. Kiebert v. Goss, 144 Idaho 225, 227, 159
P.3d 862 (2007). The trial court erred in finding that an issue of fact remained and further erred
in finding that sufficient evidence was presented at trial.
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1. Because there was no dispute concerning Sam’s complete custody and control over
Bo at the time of the injury, the trial court erred in ruling that whether the Munkhoffs
had a duty was a question of fact for the jury.
Kummerling misstates Idaho law in claiming that custodians continue to have a duty to
prevent harm after the owner has resumed custody and control. Idaho law requires that duty be
determined at the time of the injury; therefore the status of the owner or custodian at the time of
the injury dictates whether any duty existed. See Turpen v. Granieri, 133 Idaho 244, 247, 985
P.2d 669 (1999); Caldwell, 132 Idaho at 124; McClain, 104 P. at 1026. This rule is unaffected by
the duration or nature of the prior custody or the custodian’s knowledge. See McClain, 17 Idaho
at 1017 (discussing dismissal at trial of claim against head of household for injuries that occurred
after family dog was removed from the home by other family members).
Coeur d’Alene Municipal Code §§6.20.030 and .040 and Idaho Code §25-2805(2) are
addressed to the “owner or custodian” not to the “owner and custodian,” implicitly recognizing
that there may be situations where the duty is imposed on either the owner or the custodian, but
not both. (Emphasis added.) Whether one is the custodian is determined by whether at the time
of the injury one has undertaken to protect the animal and control its actions. Bright v. Maznik,
162 Idaho 311, 396 P.3d 1193, 1196 (2017); McClain, 104 P. at 1026; see also, Caldwell, 132
Idaho at 123-24. Notably, here, Animal Control cited Sam for violations of §6.20.040, but not
the Munkhoffs. (R 101)
Kummerling’s representation that McClain stands for the proposition that whether any
person is a custodian is always a question of fact for the jury is inconsistent with the McClain
court’s holding and the facts of that case. Significantly, in McClain, John P. Vollmer who (like
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the Munkhoffs) “kept, harbored, owned, and maintained” the errant dog at his family residence
was dismissed upon a motion for nonsuit and received a judgment for costs. McClain, 104 P. at
1018. The McClain court held that whether John P. Vollmer’s son, Norman Vollmer, who was
present at the time of the injury, was “the owner, harborer, or in control was a question of fact to
be determined by the jury.” Id. at 1026. Neither the Supreme Court nor the trial court made any
such ruling as to John P. Vollmer, who was not present at the time of the injury. Id.
McClain, therefore, stands for the proposition that the liability of persons who harbor a dog
generally is cut off by the act of another of assuming custody and removing the dog from the
residence; but that a question of fact may exist as to whether persons who removed the dog were
custodians at the time of the injury. Id. In McClain, as is the case here, it was the act of removing
the dog from the control of the head of the household that was sufficient to terminate liability for
the injury.
An owner’s undertaking to remove a dangerous dog from the custody and control of the
custodian is sufficient to terminate the legal responsibility of the custodian for the dog. This is
the law in Idaho, and it is consistent with Idaho law concerning custodians of dangerous persons
and with the law of other states, even where the owner or custodian is aware of the dangerous
propensities of the dog. See, e.g., McClain, 104 P. at 1017; Jones v. Starnes, 150 Idaho 257, 261,
245 P.3d 1009 (2011) (holding knowledge of dangerous propensities is insufficient to extend
duty beyond period of custody and control); Stoddart v. Pocatello Sch. Dist. No. 25, 149 Idaho
679, 687, 239 P.3d 784 (2010); Cormier v. Willis, 313 Ga. App. 699, 701, 722 S.E.2d 416 (2012)
(no liability under Georgia dangerous dog statute where defendant did not have management or
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control of dog at the time of the injury); Goodman v. Kahn, 182 Ga. App. 724, 725, 356 S.E.2d
757 (1987) (finding no liability under Georgia dangerous dog statute where roommate did not
have custody or control at time of injury, despite alleged knowledge of dangerous propensities
and previous care for dog); Auster v. Norwalk United Methodist Church, 286 Conn. 152, 160,
943 A.2d 391 (2008) (holding evidence was insufficient to sustain the jury’s verdict finding
church liable for injury by dog kept on church grounds, despite knowledge of prior attack by
dog, the fact that the dog was owned by an employee of the church who resided on church
property, and undertaking by the church to direct dog owner’s management of the dog).
2.

Idaho law does not impose a duty on custodians to prevent injury that occurs after
the owner of the dangerous dog has resumed custody and control.

Resting on his unsupported assertion that the Munkhoffs assumed permanent responsibility
for Bo, Kummerling argues the Munkhoffs were “responsible for any foreseeable damage that
can be caused by” Bo. (Resp. Br. at 16) Once again, this is inconsistent with the facts at
summary judgment and at trial, the finding of the trial court regarding Bo’s residence, and Idaho
law.
Although Kummerling cites Braese v. Stinker Stores, Inc. for the proposition that custodians
have a continuous duty to prevent care if they have knowledge of an animal’s dangerous
propensities, Braese is distinguishable. (Resp. Br. at 13 (citing Braese v. Stinker Stores, Inc., 157
Idaho 443, 337 P.3d 602 (2014)). In Braese, the injury occurred on the premises of the
defendant, a retailer. Id. at 444-45. At issue was whether allowing dogs in a store created an
unreasonable risk to members of the public who entered the store and whether there was a duty
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to protect patrons from the particular dog at issue. Id. at 445-46. The injury did not occur outside
the premises, while the dog was under the sole control of the owner, and the plaintiff did not
assert that the retailer’s duty continued after the dog left the store. Id. at 443.
Braese would have application here if the injury had occurred because of failure to protect or
warn Kummerling when he was on the Munkhoff’s property, but that is not what occurred. Here,
it is undisputed that the injury occurred on or near Kummerling’s own property when the
Munkhoffs were not present. (R 11-13) No evidence was presented that showed that the
Munkhoffs had assumed a duty to control Bo after he had been removed from the Munkhoffs’
property by their adult son.
“Although a person can assume a duty to act on a particular occasion, the duty is limited to
the discrete episode in which the aid is rendered.” Boots ex rel Boots v. Winters, 145 Idaho 389,
396, 179 P.3d 352 (2008). The assumed duty is further limited to the duty actually assumed and
exists only to the extent that there is an actual undertaking. Beers v. Corp. of the Pres. of Church
of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 155 Idaho 680, 688, 316 P.3d 92 (2013). Kummerling seeks
to extend Mark Munkhoff’s agreement in November 2012 to follow the requirements verbally
explained to him by Officer Deus to impose unlimited duties to protect the public from all
foreseeable harms, regardless whether or not Sam resumed custody and control of Bo. (Resp. Br.
at 15)
City ordinances can define the standard of care owed and replace a common law duty where
(1) the regulation clearly defines the standard of conduct, (2) must have been intended to prevent
the harm that the defendant’s act caused, (3) the plaintiff is a member of the class of persons the
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regulation seeks to protect, and (4) the violation was the proximate cause of the injury. Boswell
v. Steele, 158 Idaho 554, 563, 348 P.3d 497 (2015) (citing O’Guin v. Bingham Cnty., 142 Idaho
49, 52, 122 P.3d 308 (2005)). Assuming Officer Deus accurately and completely explained the
requirements, Mark Munkhoff agreed that while Bo was under Mark Munkhoff’s custody and
control, Mark Munkhoff would: (1) keep Bo in a fenced enclosure, (2) muzzle Bo when
removing Bo from the Munkhoff’s property, and (3) place in a prominent place a sign indicating
a dangerous or aggressive dog is on the premises. (Coeur d’Alene Municipal Code §6.20.030.A,
.040.A)
The bulk of the ordinances’ requirements are clearly designed to ensure the dog is in an
enclosure or is restrained at all times; while the requirement of signage warns those persons
entering or nearing the property that an aggressive or dangerous dog is on site. See §§6.20.030,
.040. The harms sought to be prevented and persons to be protected are thus: (1) injury to
persons entering the owner or custodian’s property, (2) injury to the public resulting from the
dog getting loose, and (3) injury to persons who encounter the dog when it is removed from the
property.
The ordinances do not require owners or custodians to make general warnings to the
public to ensure that all persons within the vicinity of the dog are aware of its propensities. Coeur
d’Alene Municipal Code §§6.20.030, .040. The ordinances do not prohibit homeowners from
keeping dangerous or aggressive dogs on their property, or require continuous muzzling of the
dog at issue as Kummerling suggests. Id. (see also, R 186) Nor do the ordinances purport to
impose liability on custodians for actions by owners. Id.
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Further, by definition and under established principles of common law, the duties imposed
under the ordinances cannot be breached by persons who do not have custody of the dangerous
dog at the point in time at which the breach occurs. See Caldwell, 132 Idaho at 123-24 (holding
that the analysis for the liability of custodians requires the court to first determine if the
custodian had control over the person in question and then whether the injury was foreseeable)
(citing Restatement (Second) of Torts, §319). There was no dispute at summary judgment or at
trial that Sam had sole custody and control of Bo when Sam removed Bo from the Munkhoffs’
property without muzzling him, and continued to keep Bo unmuzzled while Sam walked Bo.
Only Sam can be liable for injury resulting out of the failure to muzzle. And, although
Kummerling alleged the Munkhoffs violated the ordinances, only Sam Munkhoff was cited. (R
101)
To the extent that any liability can extend to the Munkhoffs based upon negligence per se,
the only creditable potential basis was the alleged inadequate signage, and that only to the extent
that evidence established the lack of adequate signage before Sam resumed custody and control
of Bo proximately caused a dog bite that occurred after Sam removed Bo from the Munkhoffs’
property without a muzzle and did not prevent Kummerling from petting Bo after Kummerling
asked Sam if it was safe to pet Bo.
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3.

Kummerling did not dispute the material facts which determined whether the
Munkhoffs breached a duty to Kummerling and failed to present any evidence
establishing that any action by the Munkhoffs was a proximate cause of the
injury.

As a threshold matter, Kummerling was required to show a duty recognized by Idaho law.
Stoddart, 149 Idaho at 683. Kummerling presented no evidence from which the trial court or the
jury could infer the Munkhoffs had custody and control over Bo when Bo bit Kummerling. (R
107-14) In fact, Kummerling in his pleadings agreed that Sam owned Bo and that only Sam was
present when Bo bit Kummerling. (R 12-13)
Under Idaho law the custodian’s custody and control at the time of the injury must be
established before the trial court’s analysis moves to a determination of the scope and nature of
the custodian’s duty. Caldwell, 132 Idaho at 123-24. If the dangerous person or animal is not in
the defendant’s custody and control at the time of the injury, there can be no breach that is the
basis for liability, and the analysis stops. Id. at 124. Only after the court finds the supervising
person or entity has control does the trial court move on to consider foreseeability. Id. This
analysis is consistent with Idaho law limiting the affirmative duty to control others to instances
where the defendant has a right and an ability to do so. Turpen v.Granieri, 133 Idaho at 248.
Here the trial court erred by diving into analysis of the extent and nature of the Munkhoffs’
duties to Kummerling without stopping to consider that it was undisputed that only Sam had
custody and control of Bo at the critical time. (See R 172-76) This error was compounded when
the trial court found sufficient evidence at trial to support the jury’s verdict without considering
or applying the correct legal standard. (See R 448, 451-52)
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Because only Sam was present and in control of Bo at the time of the injury, disputed facts
concerning the extent of the Munkhoffs’ knowledge of Bo’s propensities and the requirements of
local ordinances, and whether the Munkhoffs had violated those ordinances were immaterial.
Caldwell, 132 Idaho at 124. Yet, these facts formed the bases for the trial court’s denial of
summary judgment and denial of the motion for remittitur and for new trial. (R 172-76, 448,
251-52)
Questions of fact regarding foreseeability are material to a custodian’s liability only if the
custodian had actual control of the dangerous animal or person at the time of the injury. See
Caldwell, 132 Idaho at 123-24; Jones, 150 Idaho at 261 (holding no duty to prevent even
foreseeable injury once attacker has left premises); McClain, 104 P. at 1026. Because there were
no issues of fact concerning the Munkhoffs’ lack of control of Bo at the time of the injury, the
trial court erred in ruling that the jury must determine the existence of duty and in finding
sufficient evidence to support the jury’s award.
B.
Even if Idaho law imposed a duty on custodians who no longer have custody
and control of the dog, the trial court erred because Kummerling submitted no evidence
showing that his injury was proximately caused by an alleged breach by the Munkhoffs.
“Questions of negligence, proximate cause, intervening cause, and foreseeability are
generally regarded as questions of fact for determination by the jury unless the proof is so clear
that reasonable minds cannot draw different conclusions or where all reasonable minds would
construe the facts and circumstances in only one way.” Lundy v. Hazen, 90 Idaho 323, 327, 411
P.2d 768 (1966). Here, Kummerling presented no proof at summary judgment and only his
testimony at trial to establish that conduct by the Munkhoffs caused his injury or that Sam’s
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conduct in walking Bo without a muzzle and allowing Kummerling to attempt to pet Bo was not
a superseding cause. Thus, the trial court erred in ruling that genuine issues of material fact
remained.
1.

Kummerling presented only argument at summary judgment to establish
causation and on appeal cites to inadmissible hearsay statements.

Proximate cause requires the trial court to consider (1) whether the injury would have
occurred if the alleged breach had not occurred, and (2) whether Idaho legal policy supports
imposing liability. Doe v. Sisters of Holy Cross, 126 Idaho 1036, 1040, 895 P.2d 1229 (1995).
The Munkhoffs argued on summary judgment that because the injury occurred off their property
when Bo was not under their control, Kummerling could not establish proximate cause, and
presented affidavit evidence supporting their assertion. (R 53-54, 63-66)
Kummerling argues that there were questions of fact concerning whether the Munkhoffs, by
harboring Bo, allegedly failing to post adequate signage, and failing to muzzle Bo were a
proximate cause of his injuries. Kummerling failed, however, to present admissible evidence
linking any alleged breach to his injuries. As discussed above, the Munkhoffs breached no duty
by harboring Bo, as the Coeur d’Alene ordinances specifically allow for custodians and owners
of aggressive and dangerous dogs to keep them within the city limits, with specified limitations.
Coeur d’Alene Municipal Code §§6.20.030, .040.
Neither can Kummerling sustain a claim that the Munkhoffs’ failure to muzzle Bo was the
proximate cause of his injury because it was undisputed that it was Sam—and not the
Munkhoffs—who failed to muzzle Bo on the date of the injury. Kummerling can argue he would
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not have been injured but for Sam’s failure to muzzle Bo, but there is no genuine issue of
material fact in the record at summary judgment showing that either of the Munkhoffs were
responsible for a failure to muzzle Bo on the date of the injury. (See R 107-14) Kummerling
asserts for the first time on appeal that if he had seen a muzzle on Bo at any time prior to the date
of the incident that the muzzle would have warned him of Bo’s propensities (presumably
preventing Kummerling from attempting to pet Bo). (Resp. Br. at 23-24) This assertion is
entirely unsupported by the record and is contrary to Kummerling’s testimony at trial, including
that “he was aware of the aggressive nature of Bo based on the dog’s charging and impacting the
fence between the properties,” as re-stated by the trial court. (See id.; R 451, ¶1; Tr. Vol. I p. 59
ll. 5-11; Tr. Vol. III p. 367 ll. 10-20)
Where parties fail to come forward with any admissible evidence proving an element of their
claims, there is a failure of proof, which renders all other facts immaterial. Ambrose v. Buhl
Joint Sch. Dist. No. 412, 126 Idaho 581, 584, 887 P.2d 1088 (Ct. Ap. 1994). Raising the slightest
doubt as to the facts is insufficient; the non-moving party must create a genuine issue of material
fact. Id. Kummerling presented no evidence showing causation. The trial court therefore erred in
ruling that whether the conduct of the Munkhoffs had proximately caused Kummerling’s injury
was a question of fact for the jury and in denying the Munkhoffs’ motion for new trial and
remittitur. (See R 75; R 456)
Moreover, even if Kummerling had met his burden of coming forward with evidence
showing his injury would not have occurred but for the lack of signage, he failed to show that
being bit by Bo on his own property was a natural and probable consequence of the Munkhoffs’
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alleged failure to post signs warning that a dangerous dog was on their property. (R 107-14)
Because Kummerling failed to meet his burden on summary judgment, the trial court erred in
ruling that a genuine issue of fact remained to be determined by the jury.
2.

Even if Kummerling had presented evidence establishing causation, the
undisputed facts regarding Sam’s removal of Bo from the Munkhoffs’ home,
walking Bo without a muzzle, and allowing Kummerling to approach Bo render
Sam’s actions a superseding cause as a matter of law.

Kummerling relies solely on the fact that it is foreseeable that a dog will be walked by
someone to argue that Sam’s conduct in removing Bo from the Munkhoffs’ property, failure to
muzzle Bo, failure to warn Kummerling when Kummerling asked if it was safe to pet Bo, and
Sam’s failure to prevent Kummerling from attempting to pet Bo was not a superseding cause of
Kummerling’s injury. This Court has held, however, that the superseding cause and injury must
be a foreseeable result of the original negligence in order for liability to attach to the original
wrong-doer. Lundy, 90 Idaho at 329–30.
Kummerling fails to point to any evidence in the record suggesting that Sam’s act in walking
Bo without a muzzle was a foreseeable result of the alleged lack of signage at the Munkhoffs’
property. (See Resp. Br. at 21-22) Instead Kummerling simply argues that Sam’s conduct is not
superseding cause because it was foreseeable that Sam would walk Bo, without even identifying
the alleged negligent act by the Munkhoffs. Id. This is insufficient to create an issue of fact as to
whether Sam’s conduct was a foreseeable result of negligence by the Munkhoffs.
Because it was (and is) undisputed that Sam had sole custody and control over Bo at the time
of the injury and because Kummerling failed to come forward with proof showing his injuries
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were proximately caused by alleged breaches by the Munkhoffs and that Sam’s conduct was a
foreseeable consequence of the alleged breach, there were no genuine issues of material fact at
summary judgment. The trial court thus erred in ruling that the determination of duty and
causation was to be left for the jury. The trial court further erred by denying the Munkhoffs’
motion for new trial and remittitur when Kummerling failed to present at trial any evidence
disputing Sam’s sole custody and control of Bo at the time of the injury.
C. The trial court erred in denying the Munkhoffs’ motion for remittitur or new trial
because no evidence was admitted at trial establishing the Munkhoffs’ custody and control
over Bo at the time of the injury.
Kummerling acknowledges the Munkhoffs sought a new trial and remittitur based upon
insufficient evidence, but claims this issue is not properly before this Court merely because the
Munkhoffs’ did not use the term “custodian” in their challenge to the verdict. The Munkhoffs
argued that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdicts against either of the Munkhoffs
because the basis for liability was familial relationship and knowledge of past violations; neither
of which was sufficient under the law to support liability. (R 414-15) Notably, Kummerling
responded by arguing that whether a custodian of a dog is present at the time of injury is
irrelevant to a determination of liability. (R 432-33) Kummerling’s claim that the Munkhoffs did
not preserve the issue for appeal is thus controverted by his own briefing.
The Munkhoffs now appeal the trial court’s decision denying their motion for new trial and
remittitur on four legal bases: 1) the excessive award given under influence of passion and
prejudice (Rule 59(a)(1)(F)); 2) insufficient evidence to support the verdict (Rule 59(a)(1)(G));
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3) the necessity of remittitur in lieu of a new trial (Idaho Code § 6-807 and Rule 59.1); and 4)
justice requires relief from judgment (Rule 60(b)).
1.

The trial court abused its discretion in denying a new trial.

The test for whether the trial court abused its discretion is as follows: (1) whether the trial
court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the trial court acted within
the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal standard applicable to the
specific choices available to it; and (3) whether the trial court reached its decision by an exercise
of reason (“Sun Valley Test”). Sun Valley Shopping Ctr. v. Idaho Power, 119 Idaho 87, 94, 803
P.2d 993 (1991). This is the appropriate standard of review this Court must consider when
determining if the trial court abused its discretion in denying the Munkhoffs’ motion for new
trial and remittitur. (See Blizzard v. Lundeby, 156 Idaho 204, 206, 322 P.3d 286 (2014)). The
discretion with which the trial judge is entrusted is a sound legal or judicial discretion. Blaine v.
Byers, 91 Idaho 665, 671, 429 P.2d 397 (1967).
a.

The trial court erred in denying a new trial based on the excessive damages
inappropriately assessed against Mark and Robyn Munkhoff.

Here, under Sun Valley the trial court perceived the issue of whether there were excessive
damages awarded as one of discretion, but did not act within the outer boundaries of its
discretion and consistently with the legal standard applicable to the specific choices available to
it when denying a new trial based on excessive damages. A trial court may grant a new trial due
to excessive damages appearing to have been given under the influence of passion or prejudice.
I.R.C.P. 59(a)(1)(F). The trial court must consider under the “Blaine Test”, 1) whether the trial
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court’s verdict was against the weight of the evidence, and 2) whether a different result is likely
to occur on retrial (provided the correct legal standard is applied). Blaine v. Byers, 91 Idaho 665,
671, 429 P.2d 397 (1967) (emphasis added). The trial court must make an independent
determination as to whether the evidence supports the verdict. Sheridan v. St. Luke's Reg'l Med.
Ctr., 135 Idaho 775, 781, 25 P.3d 88 (2001).
Under the first prong of the Blaine Test, the trial court’s special verdict awarding nearly
$200,000 in economic and non-economic damages to Mr. Kummerling was against the weight of
the evidence. (R 460-461) Although the Munkhoffs were not custodians of Bo at the time of the
injury, had no right to prevent Sam from walking his own dog without a muzzle, and were not
present at the time of the incident, they were assessed by the jury to be 50% liable ($96,554.12)
for Mr. Kummerling’s damages. (R 149-151, 411) This exorbitant damage calculation for a
temporary custodian of an animal can only be explained by the influence of passion and
prejudice, including Kummerling’s theme during trial that parents of young adult dog owners
should be held liable for the acts of their adult children. This prejudice against parents of adult
dog owners is inconsistent with Idaho’s law and policy and led to a verdict against the weight of
evidence relieving the Munkhoffs from liability.
Under the second prong of the Blaine Test, a different result is likely to occur on retrial
because it is not the law of Idaho that parents should be held vicariously liable for actions of
their adult children; nor is the law of Idaho that the scope duty of custodians extends beyond the
actual custody of the dangerous animal or person. (See §A above.)
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Even if Sam was a minor child, the Idaho Legislature recognizes that it is contrary to public
policy to hold parents vicariously liable for the torts of their children. Fuller v. Studer, 122 Idaho
251, 254, 833 P.2d 109 (1992). Recovery against parents for the torts of their minor children is
limited to two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500.00) in Idaho.2 I.C. § 6-210. Subsection (2)
of the statute disallows recovery from parents for “less tangible damage such as pain and
suffering, wrongful death, or emotional distress,” similar to the non-economic damages awarded
to Mr. Kummerling. I.C. § 6-210 (2).
Whether or not Mark and Robyn Munkhoff had control of Sam when he took Bo off of their
premises is a legal question, not a factual question to be determined by witness credibility as the
trial court did in this case. Likewise, whether or not the Munkhoffs were custodians who could
be held liable was a question of law here, because the facts establishing Sam’s sole custody and
control of Bo at the time of the injury were never disputed. The trial court erred in reasoning
Mark and Robyn Munkhoff lacked credibility in “protestations that they had no control over
Sam’s taking Bo off their premises” and that the trial court “simply does not believe” that the
Munkhoffs couldn’t control their young adult son. (R 448) The trial court also made a point to
mention Sam was “only” twenty years old, minimizing the fact that he is an adult responsible for
his own actions and showing further prejudice to his parents. (R 448) On retrial a different result
is probable if the correct legal standard is applied.

2

A “minor” child is a child that is under 18 years old and living with their parents. I.C. § 6210(1).
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The trial court did not reach its decision to deny a new trial due to excessive damages by an
exercise of reason. For the trial court to properly uphold the jury’s decision, it must be evident
that the trial court (1) contemplated what it would have awarded if it had been the finder of fact
and (2) determined that any difference between the jury award and what the trial court would
have awarded is not so great as to show a verdict based on prejudice or passion. Barnett v. Eagle
Helicopters, Inc., 123 Idaho 361, 365, 848 P.2d 419 (1993). Here, the trial court did not
specifically state how much damages it would have assessed to each party, but generally
concluded that there would be “little, if any disparity between its award and the jury’s award.”
(R 449) The trial court failed to explain why $96,554.12 was an appropriate award of damages in
favor of Mr. Kummerling and against the Munkhoffs, especially where Sam Munkhoff was
assessed a lesser sum of $86,898.71.3
For the same reasons this Court should reverse the trial court’s decision denying a new trial
due to excessive damages, this Court should grant remittitur. I.R.C.P. 59.1. One limitation on the
use of remittiturs that has been recognized in other jurisdictions is that they are not proper if the
verdict was the result of passion or prejudice to such an extent that such passion or prejudice
may have infected the jury's decision on liability as well as damages. Quick v. Crane, 111 Idaho
759, 770, 727 P.2d 1187 (1986). At trial, Kummerling went so far as to argue there “was a
conspiracy of the Munkhoffs to keep the dog Bo’s dangerous condition from the public and
failure to take acts to protect the public from that dangerous condition.” (R 431) Due to the

3

The Judgment on Special Verdict awards Mr. Kummerling $86,898.71 against Sam Munkhoff,
$77,243.30 against Mark Munkhoff, and $19,310.82 against Robyn Munkhoff. (R 460-461)
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significant effects of passion or prejudice in this case against the Munkhoffs a new trial is proper,
but remittitur is requested as an alternative measure to ensure a more fair judgment against the
Munkhoffs.
b.

The trial court erred in denying a new trial based on insufficient evidence to
support the jury’s verdict.

According to the Sun Valley Test, the trial court incorrectly perceived the discretion
required in considering the issue of whether there was insufficient evidence to justify the verdict
or whether a new trial was proper. The trial court failed to appreciate the “qualitative difference
between a trial judge's role in deciding whether a new trial is justified based on the insufficiency
of the evidence, and whether a new trial is justified based on the amount of the jury's award of
damages.” Quick, 111 Idaho at 768. The trial court showed such indifference for the variance in
these standards by stating its analysis of insufficient evidence is “similar to the analysis set forth
above for an argument claiming the damages awarded are excessive” and failing to offer
additional substantive analysis of the evidence. (R 450)
The trial court did not act within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with
the legal standard applicable to the specific choices available to it when denying a new trial
based on insufficient evidence. A trial court may grant a new trial if there is insufficiency of
evidence to justify the verdict or that the verdict is against the law. I.R.C.P. 59(a)(1)(G). A trial
court may grant a new trial based on insufficiency of evidence if it considers all the evidence,
including its own determination of the credibility of the witnesses, and concludes that the verdict
is not in accord with its assessment of the clear weight of the evidence. Quick, 111 Idaho at 766.
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Conversely, to uphold a ruling for sufficiency of evidence, it must be evident that the trial court
weighed the evidence and determined that the verdict is supported by that evidence. Bott v.
Idaho State Bldg. Auth., 128 Idaho 580, 590, 917 P.2d 737 (1996). In the trial court’s analysis of
its denial of a new trial due to insufficient evidence, the trial court fails to adequately articulate
what evidence was considered and why it believed it could reasonably conclude the verdict was
appropriate. (See R 450-452)
The trial court failed to appropriately weigh the sufficiency of evidence of liability for
Robyn Munkhoff. As the basis to deny a new trial due to insufficiency of evidence, the trial court
explained that it questioned Robyn Munkhoff’s “complete ignorance” of Bo’s violent
propensities and her opinion that Bo was gentle and kind, yet the trial court fails to cite evidence
to controvert Robyn Munkhoff’s testimony. (R 451) No further evidence is cited by the trial
court in support of the sufficiency of evidence to justify the verdict against Robyn Munkhoff.
The trial court pointed to no evidence showing Robyn Munkhoff had control and custody of Bo
at the time Bo injured Kummerling.
The trial court failed to appropriately weigh the sufficiency of evidence showing Mark
Munkhoff’s liability. In a single sentence the trial court conclusively explains, “[t]he [c]ourt also
weighed and considered the evidence and finds that Mark Munkhoff had knowledge concerning
Bo’s propensities and that Mark knew what was required by the City of Coeur d’Alene of
someone who harbored Bo following the November incident.” (R 451) No actual evidence is
cited by the trial court in support of the sufficiency of evidence to justify the verdict against
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Mark Munkhoff. The trial court cites to no evidence showing that Mark Munkhoff had custody
and control over Bo at the time of the injury.
The trial court did not reach its decision to uphold the jury’s verdict for sufficiency of
evidence by an exercise of reason. The facts listed in Respondent’s Brief do not “demonstrate
that the Munkhoffs had care, control and custody of Bo at the time of the attack” and are merely
red herrings offered to distract from the material and undisputed facts this Court should consider.
(Resp. Br. at 28-32) From the following undisputed facts alone, all conceded to by Mr.
Kummerling at summary judgment stage in April 2016, a trial court exercising sound discretion
would grant a new trial due to insufficiency of evidence of the liability for Mark and Robyn
Munkhoff:
(i)

Sam, and only Sam, was Bo’s owner (R 149, ¶1);

(ii)

Mark and Robyn Munkhoff never received written notification from the City of
Coeur d’Alene that Bo had been declared aggressive or dangerous (R 149, ¶2);

(iii)

Bo was not on the Munkhoffs’ property at the time of the incident on July 30,
2013 (R 150, ¶4);

(iv)

Mark and Robyn Munkhoff were not present at the time Bo bit Mr. Kummerling
(R 150, ¶6);

(v)

Mark and Robyn Munkhoff were not taking care of Bo at the time Bo bit Mr.
Kummerling (R 150-151, ¶7);

(vi)

Mark and Robyn Munkhoff were not Bo’s custodian at the time Bo bit Mr.
Kummerling (R 150-151, ¶7);
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(vii)

Mark and Robyn Munkhoff had no authority to control Bo when Bo was not on
their property and not physically in their presence (R 150-151, ¶7);

(viii)

Mark and Robyn Munkhoff did not have authority to tell Sam (Bo’s only owner)
what to do with Bo when neither Sam nor Bo were on the Munkhoffs’ property (R
150-151, ¶7); and

(ix)

Sam had immediate, sole, and exclusive control of Bo at the time Bo bit Mr.
Kummerling (R 150-151, ¶7).

The trial court acknowledged in its order denying a new trial that “Mr. Kummerling testified
that he was aware of the aggressive nature of Bo based on the dog’s charging and impacting the
fence between the properties” and “he took the risk of petting a dog he knew to be aggressive.”
(R 451) Yet, Mr. Kummerling was only assessed 5% of fault. The trial court also claimed to
believe “Sam Munkhoff had the greatest responsibility for the dog when he was in town and
living with Mark and Robyn Munkhoff, as he was at the time of the incident” and that “Sam
Munkhoff likely had the most knowledge of Bo’s propensities.” (R 451) No facts were presented
at trial disputing Sam’s exclusive control over Bo at the time of the injury. Yet, Sam Munkhoff
was assigned less than half of the fault (45%), and less fault than his parents combined (50%),
even though he had 100% control and ownership of the dog at the time of the July 30, 2013
incident. These factors further demonstrate how the trial court did not reach its decision to
uphold the jury’s verdict for sufficiency of evidence by any exercise of logical reasoning.
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2.

The trial court erred in denying the Munkhoffs relief from final judgment.

Finally, the Munkhoffs were denied relief from judgment pursuant to I.R.C.P. 60(b). All of
the foregoing reasons justify relief from final judgment. The excessive damages assessed against
Mark and Robyn Munkhoff and the fact that such damages were awarded based on grossly
insufficient evidence to support the Munkhoffs' culpability are more than sufficient to justify
relief from final judgment in this case. The trial court abused its discretion in denying the
Munkhoffs relief from final judgment

IV.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should hold that the trial court abused its discretion

in denying the Munkhoffs' motion for remittitur or new trial, reverse, and remand the case for a
new trial. Alternatively, the Munkhoffs ask this Court to reverse the decision of the trial court on
the Munkhoffs' motion for summary judgment and remand this matter for entry of an order
dismissing all claims against the Munkhoffs.
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